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AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION v. BURWELL:  
CORRECTLY CHOOSING BUT ERRONEOUSLY APPLYING 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN MANDAMUS RELIEF CONCERNING 
AGENCY NONCOMPLIANCE 
MICHAEL L. LABATTAGLIA∗ 
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell,1 the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia considered whether to compel 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to conduct 
Medicare reimbursement hearings that had not occurred within a ninety-day 
statutory deadline.2  Plaintiff hospitals awaiting their hearings for far longer 
than ninety days sought mandamus relief; a judicial remedy to direct HHS 
to conduct the hearings in compliance with the statutory deadline.3  Unlike 
some courts in other federal circuits, courts in the D.C. Circuit do not 
automatically issue mandamus relief whenever an agency does not comply 
with a statutory deadline.4  Accordingly, the district court employed a 
discretionary test to evaluate whether mandamus relief was appropriate 
based on individualized factors of the case.5  In applying the test in this 
case, the district court denied mandamus relief.6 
This Note will support the D.C. Circuit’s use of a discretionary 
balancing test but argues that the district court erroneously balanced the 
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 1.  76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. at 48. 
 4.  Id. at 50; see infra Part II.B. 
 5.  Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 50. 
 6.  Id. at 56. 
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relevant factors.7  On one side of the scale, the district court allowed its 
strict posture of deference toward agency policymaking to bias the scale too 
heavily against mandamus relief.8  On the other side, the court overlooked 
or minimized critical facts favoring mandamus relief, such as Congress’s 
purpose for the statutory deadline and specific instances in the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings demonstrating the deleterious effect of HHS’s noncompliance on 
human health and welfare.9   This Note will explain, moreover, that the 
district court’s decision illustrates the problematic void created when strict 
deference doctrine prevents courts from exercising reasonable discretion in 
protecting certain legal rights while the other branches of government lack 
forthcoming remedies to address the issue.10 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia reversed and remanded the district court’s decision.11  The 
remand order instructed the district court to include and reconsider certain 
factors in the balancing test, and reminded the district court of its ultimate 
obligation to enforce the law as intended by Congress.12  The remand order 
instructions substantiate points argued in this Note and underscore the 
conclusion that the district court should have issued mandamus relief in the 
first instance of deciding the case.13 
I.  THE CASE 
Health care providers that furnish services to Medicare patients receive 
payment from HHS through an administrative process.14  Providers begin 
this administrative process by first submitting reimbursement claims to a 
Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”).15  Providers may appeal a 
MAC’s claim denial by requesting that the MAC conduct a redetermination 
of the claim within sixty days of filing.16  If the MAC denies the claim for a 
second time, providers may then appeal to a Qualified Independent 
Contractor (“QIC”).17  The QIC reviews the MAC’s redetermination within 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 196–201. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 11.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  This Note was 
selected for publication prior to the decision on Feb. 9, 2016 by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the decision of the district court.   
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.; see infra Part IV. 
 14.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 46 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (referring to the four-step administrative process detailed in 42 U.S.C 
§ 1395ff (2012)). 
 15.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395kk–1(a)(1)–(4), 1395ff(a)(2)(A)).   
 16.  Id. (citing § 1395ff(a)(3)).   
 17.  Id.  
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sixty days.18   Providers who are not satisfied with the QIC’s decision may 
request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).19  The ALJ 
provides the only guarantee in the Medicare appeals process that appellants 
will receive a formal, on-the-record hearing during which they can present 
evidence and testimony.20  ALJs are statutorily required to issue a decision 
within ninety days from the time appellants request a hearing.21  A provider 
may appeal an ALJ’s decision to the Departmental Appeals Board 
(“DAB”), the final level of review within HHS.22  The DAB is required to 
issue a decision within ninety days.23  Providers may appeal DAB decisions 
to federal court.24  Providers may bypass levels of review through a process 
commonly called “escalation” if either the QIC, ALJ, or DAB is unable to 
issue a decision by its statutory deadline.25 
In recent years, the appeals process has backlogged at the ALJ level 
due to an unprecedented volume of claims submitted on appeal.26  ALJs are 
unable to issue decisions within the statutorily required ninety-day 
timeline.27  The DAB, although to a lesser degree than the ALJs, is also 
receiving more appeals than it can process and will not likely meet the 
ninety-day deadline for issuing decisions in most appeals.28 
The plaintiffs in this case, hospitals serving Medicare patients, have 
reimbursement claims backlogged at the ALJ hearing level that were not 
resolved within the ninety-day statutory timeframe and will likely remain in 
the appeals process for years.29  Plaintiffs have exhausted the first two 
levels of the Medicare appeals process and, meanwhile, await the 
opportunity to present their case for reimbursement before an ALJ.30   
Facing financial losses from the nearly 2000 backlogged appeals, worth 
more than $10 million, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary of HHS to demand 
the timely adjudication of their appeals.31 
                                                          
 18.  Id. (citing § 1395ff(c)).  
 19.  Id. (citing §§ 1395ff(b)(1)(E)(i), (d)(1)(A)). 
 20.  Id. at 48 (explaining that the ALJ level is the first, and only, guaranteed opportunity for 
appellants to provide oral testimony within the administrative appeals process). 
 21.  Id. at 46 (citing § 1395ff(d)(1)(a)). 
 22.  Id. (citing § 1395ff(d)(2)). 
 23.  Id. at 47. 
 24.  Id. at 46 (citing §§ 405.980, 405.1130). 
 25.  Id. at 47. 
 26.  Id. at 46. 
 27.  Id. at 47.  Since 2013, HHS has suspended assigning new provider-based claims to ALJs.  
Medicare beneficiaries, who are served by the same appeals process, continue to have their claims 
assigned to ALJs.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. at 45. 
 30.  Id. at 48. 
 31.  Id. at 45. 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A court’s parameters for compelling agency action when that agency 
misses a statutory deadline are discernable in the following discussion.32  
Part II.A of this Note outlines the authority that permits a court to direct an 
agency to act.33  Part II.B analyzes the various ways in which courts have 
treated the issue of whether to compel agency action when an agency 
misses a statutory deadline.34 
A.  Courts May Compel Agency Action When an Agency Fails to Act 
Courts may compel agencies to act when agencies fail to perform their 
official duties.35  Part II.A.1 explains the Writ of Mandamus as a 
mechanism for federal courts to order government agencies to act.36  Part 
II.A.2 discusses the judicial review provisions within the Administrative 
Procedures Act (“APA”) that allow courts to issue mandamus relief against  
federal agencies that fail to perform their official duties.37  Part II.A.3 
examines how courts approach mandamus relief when agencies do not 
comply with deadlines contained in their enabling statutes.38 
1.  Writ of Mandamus 
A Writ of Mandamus is a judicial vehicle for a federal court to order a 
government agency to perform a required act.39  Specifically, a mandamus 
action empowers a court “to compel an officer or employee of the United 
States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”40  The 
United States Supreme Court recognizes that a party seeking mandamus 
relief must demonstrate that they have been deprived of a clear and 
indisputable right.41  The Court has also explained that “mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.”42  
Finally, the Supreme Court recognizes that granting mandamus relief is a 
matter of discretion with the reviewing court.43 
                                                          
 32.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 33.  See infra Part II.A. 
 34.  See infra Part II.B. 
 35.  See infra Part II.A. 
 36.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 37.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 38.  See infra Part II.A.3. 
 39.  28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012).   
 40.  Id.   
 41.  See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988) 
(outlining the pleading requirements for mandamus relief). 
 42. Id. at 289. 
 43.  Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia uses a 
three-prong standard for plaintiffs pleading mandamus relief.44  Plaintiffs in 
the D.C. Circuit courts must plead that they have “a clear right to relief,” 
that the agency “has a clear duty to act,” and that there is “no other adequate 
remedy available to plaintiff.”45  Regarding the final prong, the remedy 
must be either unavailable or inadequate rather than merely reflect a 
plaintiff’s preference for one form of remedy over another.46  Moreover, 
courts in the D.C. Circuit may decline to issue mandamus relief at their 
discretion even when a plaintiff meets the pleading standard, especially in 
matters of complex bargaining between the coordinate branches of 
government.47  For example, in National Wildlife Federation v. United 
States,48 the D.C. Circuit declined to issue mandamus relief when it 
involved “intrud[ing]” into complex federal budget matters that were best 
left to the legislative and executive branches.49 
2.  Administrative Procedures Act 
The judicial review provisions of the APA provide a framework for 
courts to use mandamus relief when agencies do not perform their official 
duties.50  Section 701(6) states: “The reviewing court shall compel agency 
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . . .”51  Judicial review 
is precluded by Section 701(a)(2) to the extent that “agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”52  Finally, Section 702 states: 
“Nothing herein . . . affects other limitations on judicial review or the power 
or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other 
appropriate legal or equitable ground . . . .”53 
Two Supreme Court cases clarify, to some degree, the APA’s judicial 
review provisions concerning mandamus relief.  In the first case, Norton v. 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (“SUWA”),54 the Court announced, “the 
only agency action that can be compelled under the APA is covered in 
Section 706(1)’s mandate for courts to compel agency action “unlawfully 
                                                          
 44.  Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Id. at 787. 
 47.  See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208, 212 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that 
even when a duty is clear and indisputable, issuance of writ of mandamus is committed to the 
discretion of the court).   
 48.  626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 49.  Id. at 924 
 50.  5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1) (2012). 
 51.  Id. § 706(1) (internal numbering omitted). 
 52.  Id. § 701(a)(2). 
 53.  Id. § 702 (internal numbering omitted). 
 54.  542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004).   
LaBattagliaFinalBookProof 4/21/2016  8:55 AM 
2016] AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION v. BURWELL 1071 
withheld.”55  Justice Scalia briefly distinguished action “unreasonably 
delayed” in a footnote; “Of course, [Section] 706(1) also authorizes courts 
to ‘compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed’—but a delay cannot be 
unreasonable with respect to action that is not required.”56  Justice Scalia’s 
footnote bifurcates Section 706(1) and arguably weakens the mandate for a 
court to compel agency action that is “unreasonably delayed.”57  In the 
second case, Heckler v. Chaney,58 the Court limited the extent to which 
Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of agency action that is 
committed to agency discretion by law.59  The Court held that matters of 
agency discretion covered by Section 701(a)(2) enjoy a presumption against 
judicial review but are not totally immune from judicial review.60  The 
Court explained, “the presumption [of unreviewability in the APA] may be 
rebutted where the [enabling] statute has provided guidelines for the agency 
to follow.”61 
3.  Enabling Statute 
Specific commands from Congress in the enabling statute may rebut 
the presumption of unreviewability within Section 701(a)(2) and thereby 
allow a court to issue mandamus relief even when the action is committed 
to agency discretion.62  The Heckler Court stressed the importance of the 
specific language in the enabling statute by explaining, “Congress may limit 
an agency’s exercise of . . . power if it wishes, either by setting substantive 
priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to 
discriminate among issues or cases it will pursue.”63  The Heckler Court 
added, “Congress did not set agencies free to disregard legislative direction 
in the statutory scheme that the agency administers.”64  Justice Marshall, in 
concurrence, addressed the role courts have in balancing deference to 
agencies and issuing mandamus relief, stating: 
[R]ecognizing that courts must approach the substantive task of 
reviewing such failures [to meet statutory requirements] with 
appropriate deference to an agency’s legitimate need to set policy 
through the allocation of scarce budgetary and enforcement 
resources. . . . [T]he Court’s approach, if taken literally, would 
                                                          
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 63 n.1. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 59.  See id. at 832 (interpreting § 701(a)(2) of the APA). 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 832–33. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 833. 
 64.  Id.  
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take the courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far 
too many cases . . . .65 
B.  The Federal Circuits Are Split on When to Compel Action for 
Agency Non-Compliance with a Statutory Deadline 
A split exists among the federal circuit courts regarding whether to 
automatically issue mandamus relief when an agency misses a statutory 
deadline.66  Part II.B.1 examines decisions from federal circuit courts that 
interpret missed statutory deadlines as action “unlawfully withheld” under 
Section 706(1).67  As such, these courts interpret the phrase “shall compel 
agency action” in Section 706(1) as mandating a court to issue mandamus 
relief.68  In contrast, Part II.B.2 analyzes decisions from federal courts, 
including the D.C. Circuit, that interpret missed statutory deadlines as 
action “unreasonably delayed” under Section 706(1).69  Under this 
framework, courts interpret the phrase “shall compel agency action” as 
providing discretion, rather than a mandate, for determining whether to 
issue mandamus relief.70 
1.  Interpreting Section 706(1) of the APA as Requiring Courts to 
Issue Mandamus Relief When an Agency Misses a Statutory 
Deadline 
Some federal circuit courts interpret a missed statutory deadline as 
“agency action unlawfully withheld” under Section 706(1).71  As such, 
noncompliance with a statutory deadline serves as a per se violation of the 
APA.72  For example, in Tenth Circuit jurisprudence, Forrest Guardians v. 
Babbitt73 demonstrates that agency action is “unlawfully withheld” when an 
agency fails to meet “a statutorily imposed absolute deadline.”74  Similarly, 
in the Ninth Circuit case, Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Badgley,75 the 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 855 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 66.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 67.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
 68.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 69.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 70.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 71.  See infra notes 74–76 and accompanying text; see also DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R43013, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND CLAIMS OF UNREASONABLE 
DELAY: ANALYSIS OF COURT TREATMENT 7 (2013) (identifying that various lower courts make a 
distinction between actions unlawfully withheld and actions unreasonably delayed). 
 72.  SHEDD, supra note 71.  
 73.  174 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 1999) (determining that failure to comply with a statutorily 
imposed absolute deadline constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld). 
 74.  Id. at 1190. 
 75.  309 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2002).   
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court held that a missed statutory deadline violates the “clear congressional 
intent” and “frustrate[s] the policy Congress sought to implement.”76 
Federal courts that interpret a missed statutory deadline as “action 
unlawfully withheld” often strictly interpret the Section 706(1) phrase 
“shall compel agency action” to require mandamus relief.77  As such, these 
courts automatically issue mandamus relief without discretion.78  For 
example, in Forrest Guardians, the Tenth Circuit held that “when an entity 
governed by the APA fails to comply with a statutorily imposed absolute 
deadline . . . courts, upon proper application, must compel the agency to 
act.”79  In Badgley, the Ninth Circuit held that an agency’s “failure to [act] 
within the mandated time frame compelled the court to grant injunctive 
relief . . . [with] no discretion to consider the [agency’s] stated priorities.”80 
2. Interpreting Section 706(1) of the APA as Permitting Judicial 
Discretion to Issue Mandamus Relief When an Agency Misses a 
Statutory Deadline 
The D.C. Circuit departs from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in deciding 
how to issue mandamus relief when an agency does not comply with its 
statute.81  Specifically, the D.C. Circuit interprets the phrase “shall compel 
agency action” under Section 706(1) as permitting the court to use 
discretion in deciding whether to issue mandamus relief.82  For example, the 
D.C. District Court in Center for Biological Diversity v. Pirie83 held that a 
court is not required to compel agency action under Section 706(1) 
“[d]espite language in the substantive provisions of the [statute] written in 
mandatory terms.”84  The D.C. Circuit based its discretionary interpretation 
of Section 706(1) in the text of Section 702; “[b]ecause [Section] 702 of the 
APA explicitly states that a court retains equitable discretion, this Court can 
not hold that Congress has clearly and unequivocally limited that discretion 
under the APA.”85 
                                                          
 76.  Id. at 1175. 
 77.  See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 78.  See infra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 79.  174 F.3d at 1190. 
 80.  309 F.3d at 1178.   
 81.  Compare Forrest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190 (interpreting § 706(1) of the APA as 
mandating a court to issue mandamus relief), and Badgley, 309 F.3d at 1178 (same), with Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated as moot, Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 179848, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) 
(criticizing the reasoning used by the Tenth Circuit in Forrest Guardians). 
 82.  See text accompanying infra note 84. 
 83.  Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 118.   
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. at 119. 
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In exercising the judicial discretion recognized in Sections 706(1) and 
702, the D.C. Circuit uses a factor test to determine whether to issue 
mandamus relief.86  The D.C. Circuit categorizes a missed statutory 
deadline as “unreasonably delayed” under Section 706(1) and will issue 
mandamus relief when an agency’s delay is “so egregious as to warrant 
mandamus.”87  In Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC88 
(“TRAC”), the D.C. Circuit established a factor test (the “TRAC” test) to 
determine when a delay is sufficiently egregious.89  The TRAC test weighs 
six factors.  The court should first consider “the time agencies take to make 
decisions must be governed by a rule of reason.”90  Second, “where 
Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory 
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason.”91  The court will also 
consider that “delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic 
regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake.”92  
The court should consider, fourth, “the effect of expediting delayed action 
on agency activities of a higher or competing priority,”93 and, fifth, “the 
nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.”94  Finally, the reason 
for the delay must not be due to any impropriety.95  In TRAC, the court 
acknowledged that the factor test “is hardly ironclad, and sometimes suffers 
from vagueness, [but] it nevertheless provides useful guidance in assessing 
claims of agency delay.”96 
The D.C. Circuit has used the TRAC test with varied results depending 
on the strength of certain factors.97  Strong showings of the first two TRAC 
                                                          
 86.  See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.   
 87.  See infra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. 
FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 88.  750 F. 2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 89.  Id. at 80 (establishing, but not applying, the factor test). 
 90.  Id. (quoting Potomac Electric Power Company v. ICC (PEPCO), 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); and then citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC (MCI), 627 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)).  
 91.  Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34–35 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); then citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 n.30 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983); and then citing PEPCO, 702 F.2d at 1034). 
 92.  Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34; then citing Auchter, 702 
F.2d at 1157; and then citing Blankenship v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 587 
F.2d 329, 334 (6th Cir. 1978)).  
 93.  Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34; then citing Auchter, 702 
F.2d at 1158).  
 94.  Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 35). 
 95.  Id. (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 740 F.2d at 34). 
 96.  Id. at 80.  
 97.  Compare In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasizing TRAC 
test factor number four to deny mandamus relief), with In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 
F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasizing TRAC test factor number as “most important” in 
granting mandamus relief).   
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factors, which emphasize the importance of the deadline, weigh in favor of 
mandamus relief.98  For example, in In re People’s Mojahedin Organization 
of Iran,99 the D.C. Circuit court issued mandamus relief when it found that 
a twenty-month failure to act on a 180-day statutory deadline “plainly 
frustrate[d] the congressional intent and cut[] strongly in favor of granting 
[the] mandamus petition.”100  On the other hand, a strong showing of the 
fourth TRAC factor, which favors agency autonomy and deference, has 
traditionally made courts hesitant to use mandamus relief.101  For example, 
in In re Barr Labs,102 the D.C. district court determined that forcing the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to comply with a 180-day deadline 
would inappropriately interfere with the deference Congress granted to 
FDA to order its priorities.103 
The D.C. Circuit has provided guiding principles that assist in 
evaluating the remaining TRAC factors.104  Regarding the third and fifth 
factors—which concern the interest in delays that might be less tolerable 
when human health and welfare are at stake—the D.C. Circuit has 
explained that human health and welfare are at stake when agencies delay in 
action such as requiring Aspirin warning labels and regulating raw milk.105  
Regarding the sixth factor, the D.C. Circuit will not favor mandamus relief 
where an agency shows “marked improvement in managing its docket, and 
there is little reason to believe” a court order is “necessary to sustain that 
improvement or . . . helpful in spurring greater effort.”106 
In a nearly identical case regarding mandamus relief decided shortly 
after American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held in Cumberland County 
Hospital System v. Burwell107 that a plaintiff-hospital did not adequately 
plead a clear and indisputable right to an ALJ hearing.108  The court 
reasoned that Congress “set[] out escalation as an alternate course in the 
                                                          
 98.  See infra note 100 and accompanying text.   
 99.  680 F.3d 832 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 100.  Id. at 837. 
 101.  See infra note 103 and accompanying text.   
 102.  930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 103.  Id. at 75 (emphasizing TRAC test factor four in finding that a statutory deadline does not 
necessarily serve as proxy for Congress’s intent to dictate agency priorities).   
 104.  See generally Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (explaining each factor of the TRAC test).   
 105.  See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“All 
scientific evidence in the record points to a link between salicylates and Reye’s Syndrome . . . .”); 
see also Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985) (“Officials at the highest 
levels of the [agency] have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to the public 
health.”). 
 106.  See In re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., AFL-CIO, 837 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 107.  Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, 
at *6 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015). 
 108.  See id. (denying mandamus relief without reaching the merits of the case). 
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case of a delay . . . [and] therefore, expressly anticipated delays in Medicare 
adjudications and prescribed escalation as the remedy.”109  The court also 
noted that had the plaintiffs been eligible for mandamus, the court would 
have found that the particular circumstances did not merit mandamus relief 
under a TRAC-like factor test.110 
In summation, specific direction from Congress within an agency’s 
enabling statute provides a basis for a court to issue mandamus relief when 
an agency does comply with that direction.111  When that specific direction 
from Congress is a statutory deadline, the federal circuits split as to how 
they interpret and apply the relevant judicial review provisions of the APA 
when an agency misses its deadline.112  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
conclude, under Section 706(1), that agency action has been unlawfully 
withheld and a court must issue mandamus relief.113  Alternatively, the D.C. 
Circuit concludes, under Section 706(1), that agency action has been 
delayed and a factor test is required to determine if the delay is so egregious 
as to warrant mandamus relief.114 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia denied mandamus relief when 
HHS failed to comply with a statutory deadline, holding that HHS’s delay 
was “not so egregious as to warrant intervention” in the form of mandamus 
relief.115  In reaching the merits of the case, the district court followed the 
D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudential position that an agency’s noncompliance with 
a statutory deadline concerns agency delay rather than an agency’s refusal 
to act.116  As such, the district court considered whether HHS’s delay was 
“so egregious” as to warrant mandamus relief.117  The district court noted 
that D.C. Circuit jurisprudence provides “no per se rule as to how long is 
too long” of a delay before a court should be compelled to issue mandamus 
relief.118  The district court applied the six-factor TRAC test to evaluate the 
delay.119 
                                                          
 109.  Id.  
 110.  Id. at *7 n.5. 
 111.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 112.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 113.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 114.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 115.  76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 116.  Id. at 50 (quoting Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 705 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 
1984)). 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. (citing In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(quoting In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir.1992))). 
 119.  Id.  
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The district court first addressed TRAC factors one and two 
concurrently in evaluating HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory 
deadline.120  The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that noncompliance 
with a statutory deadline alone justified intervention, distinguishing the case 
from People’s Mojahedin where the D.C. Circuit granted mandamus relief 
in response to an agency’s failure to meet a statutory deadline.121  In 
contrast, the court adopted the Secretary’s position that Barr Labs provided 
the controlling authority, explaining that although “HHS has violated its 
statutory framework, this conclusion ‘does not, alone, justify judicial 
intervention.’”122 
Next, the district court concurrently examined TRAC factors three and 
five, which concern the consequences of non-intervention to plaintiffs and 
the public.123  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the effect of 
reimbursement delays—forcing hospitals to “reduce costs, eliminate jobs, 
forego services, and substantially scale back”124—have sufficiently harmed 
patient health and welfare.125  The court, rather, found that the effects were 
“real consequences to health and welfare, [but] . . . not the kind of 
immediate and undisputed dangers that have weighed heavily in the TRAC 
analysis in other cases.”126  Moreover, the court noted, “[n]early everything 
HHS does affects human health and welfare—and that context matters.”127  
As the D.C. Circuit explained in Sierra Club v. Thomas,128 “[a]lthough this 
court has required greater agency promptness as to actions involving 
interests relating to human health and welfare, . . . this factor alone can 
hardly be considered dispositive when, as in this case, virtually the entire 
docket of the agency involves issues of this type.”129  The court, therefore, 
found that the third and fifth TRAC factors weighed “only very lightly in 
favor of granting relief.”130 
The district court then considered TRAC factor four, which considers 
the effect of mandamus relief on the agency’s competing priorities.131  The 
court agreed with the Secretary’s comparison of her case to that of Barr 
Labs, where the D.C. Circuit relied on TRAC factor four in denying 
                                                          
 120.  Id. at 51. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. (quoting In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 123.  Id. at 51–52. 
 124.  Id. at 52. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. (contrasting the danger to public health caused by certified raw milk in Pub. Citizen v. 
Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985), with unlabeled aspirin in Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 129.  Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club, 828 F.2d at 798). 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 53. 
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mandamus relief.132  Similar to Barr Labs, the district court reasoned that 
mandamus relief would impinge on the “autonomy and comparative 
institutional advantage of the executive branch” by “assum[ing] command 
over an agency’s choice of priorities.”133  The district court noted that 
mandamus relief in this case is “precisely the kind of conundrum the D.C. 
Circuit has cautioned courts against trying to solve.”134  In short, the district 
court concluded that mandamus relief “is not a license to intermeddle, and 
the court is loath to horn in on the problem-solving efforts of the other two 
branches of government.”135 
Finally, the district court evaluated the Secretary’s previous efforts in 
addressing the backlog in the sixth and final factor of the TRAC test.136  
Under TRAC factor six, “the good faith of the agency in addressing the 
delay weighs against mandamus.”137 The district court identified good faith 
in that HHS had “taken modest steps to increase ALJ work capacity: it is 
moving to electronic processing, has added ALJs, provided support for 
ALJs, and offered alternative adjudication options.”138  The district court 
simultaneously rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Secretary’s 
measures “[did] not establish good faith, considering the fact that even the 
Secretary acknowledges that [these steps] will not solve the backlog 
problem.”139  The district court found, however, that the “agency’s efforts 
do not offer a perfect resolution” but “move in the right direction,” enough 
to weigh against mandamus.140 
The district court concluded its decision to deny mandamus relief by 
noting that its “conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Congress is aware of 
the situation and is in a position to address the problem.”141  The district 
court urged the Secretary and Congress to continue working together 
toward a solution.142  The district court further opined that “[h]ospitals that 
are owed reimbursement should not be indefinitely deprived of funds” but 
they must wait until the TRAC test factors shift in their favor.143 
                                                          
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 54. 
 135.  Id. at 54–55. 
 136.  Id. at 55–56. 
 137.  Id. at 56 (quoting Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C. 2005); In 
re Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emp., AFL–CIO, 837 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing mandamus 
relief where the agency showed “marked improvement in managing its docket, and there [was] 
little reason to believe” a court order was “necessary to sustain that improvement or . . . helpful in 
spurring greater effort”)). 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id.  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id.  
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
In American Hospital Association v. Burwell, the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that HHS’s noncompliance 
with a statutory ninety-day Administrative Law Judge hearing deadline did 
not warrant mandamus relief.144  Part IV.A proposes that the district court 
correctly interpreted the APA as allowing judicial discretion in deciding 
whether to issue mandamus relief when HHS failed to comply with its 
statutory deadline.145  Part IV.B concludes that the district court erred, 
however, in exercising its discretion by misapplying the TRAC factor test to 
deny mandamus relief.146  Instead, the district court should have granted 
mandamus relief based on a strong showing of the TRAC factors indicating 
that the delay was sufficiently “egregious.”147  Part IV.C asserts that, as an 
additional policy matter, the uncertainty of any forthcoming remedy from 
HHS and Congress in addressing the delay further bolsters the argument for 
mandamus relief.148 
A.  The District Court Correctly Interpreted the APA to Allow Judicial 
Discretion Regarding Whether to Issue Mandamus 
The district court’s use of discretion regarding whether to issue 
mandamus relief follows the correct interpretation of the APA.149  Part 
IV.A.1 demonstrates that the phrase “shall compel” within Section 706(1) 
allows for judicial discretion when considered within the context of 
preceding sections.150  Part IV.A.2 establishes that the district court 
correctly analyzed HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory deadline under 
the “unreasonably delayed” rather than “unlawfully withheld” framework, 
as the former operates consistently within the judicial discretion inherent 
within Section 706(1).151 
1.  The Phrase “Shall Compel” Allows for Judicial Discretion 
Under Section 706(1) of the APA 
The district court correctly concluded that Section 706(1) does not 
mandate a court to issue mandamus relief.152  The phrase “shall compel” 
appears, on face value, to hamstring a court’s discretion whenever an 
                                                          
 144.  Id.  
 145.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 146.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 147.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 148.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 149.  See infra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 150.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 151.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 152.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
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agency misses a statutory deadline.153  The argument for strictly construing 
the word “shall” to create a mandate, indeed, begins and ends with the plain 
meaning of Section 706(1).154  The APA, however, should be interpreted 
differently from ordinary statutes and requires a contextual reading.155  A 
contextual reading of the APA supports the district court’s decision to retain 
discretion regarding whether to issue mandamus relief notwithstanding the 
use of the word “shall” in Section 706(1).156 
The sections preceding Section 706(1) provide the contextual basis for 
finding that a Section 706(1) violation does not necessarily create an 
absolute mandate for a court to issue mandamus relief.157  First, the 
seemingly draconian “shall” provision of Section 706(1) is softened by the 
Section 701(a)(2) requirement that a court must first analyze whether the 
action is committed to agency discretion and, therefore, unreviewable in 
court.158  In other words, a court may chose not to review agency action if it 
determines that Congress committed discretion to the agency.159  Second, 
Section 702 addresses judicial discretion by explaining, “[n]othing herein 
affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court 
to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or 
equitable ground.”160  Section 702 means that even if a court finds that an 
agency’s action is reviewable, a court may exercise discretion to deny 
mandamus relief for other reasons.161  A contextual reading, therefore, 
reveals that the word “shall” within Section 706(1) is subject to the 
discretionary provisions of the surrounding sections in the APA.162 
                                                          
 153.  5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012); see, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569–70 (1998) 
(stating that “shall” is mandatory, not permissive, language); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 
600, 607 (1989) (noting that “shall” is the strongest mandate Congress could possibly use). 
 154.  See Catherine Zaller, The Case for Strict Statutory Construction of Mandatory Agency 
Deadlines Under Section 706(1), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1545, 1571 (2001) (arguing that the 
word “shall” indicates mandatory conduct). 
 155.  See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. 
L.J. 1207, 1250 (2015) (arguing that APA provisions require a contextual interpretation).  Because 
the APA was designed to apply broadly to all agencies without sufficient deliberation, courts 
should interpret its provisions contextually and “adhere more closely to the compromises encoded 
in the statute’s text.”  Id. at 1211.   
 156.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–162. 
 157.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–162.  
 158.  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012); see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) 
(interpreting § 701(a)(2) as a rebuttable presumption of unreviewability of action committed to 
agency discretion, rather than interpreting the Section strictly). 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (internal numbering omitted). 
 161.  See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (D.D.C. 2002), 
vacated as moot, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003 WL 179848, at *1 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (concluding that § 702 of the APA affords courts with discretion under § 
706(1)). 
 162.  Id.  
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The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the relevant APA provisions 
lends support for a contextual interpretation that favors judicial 
discretion.163  The Court has concluded, as a general matter, that mandamus 
is “an extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.”164  
A reviewing court, therefore, has considerable discretion to decline judicial 
intervention in ordinary situations.165  Additionally, the Heckler Court 
softened the seemingly strict language of the unreviewability provision in 
Section 701(a)(2) by creating a rebuttable presumption, enabling a court to 
intervene if a plaintiff can overcome the presumption of unreviewability.166  
The Court’s interpretations of the APA, therefore, support judicial 
discretion even when the statute’s plain meaning appears to give a court 
little room to maneuver.167 
In this case, the district court correctly concluded that mandamus relief 
against HHS was not mandated.168  The district court announced, “whether 
mandamus relief should issue is discretionary.”169  Without mentioning the 
APA directly in its opinion, the district court followed the D.C. Circuit’s 
statutory interpretation of Section 706(1).170  The D.C. Circuit’s statutory 
interpretation correctly affords a court with the flexibility necessary to 
examine Section 706(1) in light of Sections 701(a)(2) and 702.171 
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Section 706(1) prevails on legal 
soundness compared to that of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.172  The Ninth 
Circuit concluded in Badgley that a missed statutory deadline “compelled 
the court to grant . . . relief” and the “court had no discretion.”173  Similarly, 
the Tenth Circuit concluded in Forrest Guardians that Congress imposed a 
mandatory duty upon an agency when a statute uses the word “shall.”174  
                                                          
 163.  See, e.g., Norton v. SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (finding that the principal purpose of 
the APA limitations on judicial intervention is to protect agencies from undue interference from 
courts); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (interpreting the APA to afford discretion to 
courts in matters of agency immunity from judicial review).   
 164.  Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988). 
 165.  Cf. id. (implying that courts have discretion to deny mandamus relief in ordinary 
situations).  
 166.  See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33 (creating a rebuttable presumption against judicial 
review rather than an absolute bar).   
 167.  Id.  
 168.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see supra notes 158–167 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 49. 
 170.  See id. at 50 (noting that issue concerned agency delay rather than a refusal to act). 
 171.  See supra note 163; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113, 
118 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated as moot, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. England, No. 02-5163, 2003 
WL 179848, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2003) (interpreting § 706(1) of the APA to afford courts 
with judicial discretion). 
 172.  See infra text accompanying notes 173–177. 
 173.  309 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 20001); see supra note 75 and accompanying text.   
 174.  See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.   
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Critics of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence side with the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits in concluding that courts are duty-bound to force agencies to 
comply with statutory deadlines because the plain meaning of the word 
“shall” is a clear manifestation of Congress’s intent to remove discretion 
from the courts.175  Such a narrow reading of Section 706(1), however, 
frustrates the context of the APA’s statutory scheme by reducing the 
discretionary provision of Section 702 to surplusage.176  Instead, the D.C. 
Circuit’s use of a balancing test to determine whether to issue mandamus 
relief harmonizes the seemingly inapposite provisions of the APA by 
reading the discretionary provision of Section 702 to qualify rather than 
contradict the language of Section 706(1).177 
2.  Courts Should Analyze Missed Statutory Deadlines Under 
Section 706(1) of the APA as “Unreasonably Delayed” Rather 
Than “Unlawfully Withheld” 
The district court correctly analyzed HHS’s noncompliance with its 
statutory deadline under the “unreasonably delayed” rather than “unlawfully 
withheld” framework of Section 706(1).178  In Norton v. SUWA, the 
Supreme Court infused Section 706(1) with additional judicial discretion by 
concluding that agency action “unreasonably delayed” does not provide the 
same basis for mandamus relief as agency action “unlawfully withheld.”179  
The Supreme Court’s bifurcation of Section 706(1) suggests that 
designating action as “unlawfully withheld” provides less need for judicial 
discretion, as the word “unlawfully” directly indicates illegal action.180   In 
contrast, designating agency action as “unreasonably delayed” appears to 
invite judicial discretion in determining whether there is good reason for the 
delay.181  To read SUWA any other way is to assert the very unlikely 
conclusion that the Supreme Court made a meaningless distinction when 
bifurcating Section 706(1).182  The “unreasonably delayed” framework, 
therefore, affords a court with a significant amount of discretion to assess 
the reasonableness of an agency’s delay when deciding whether to issue 
mandamus relief.183 
                                                          
 175.  See supra note 154 and accompanying text.   
 176.  See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (rendering meaningless the discretion noted in § 702 of the 
APA if a court is duty-bound to issue mandamus relief when applying § 706(1) of the APA). 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 179.  See Norton v. SUWA, 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (differentiating “unlawfully withheld” 
from “unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1) of the APA).   
 180.  See id. (suggesting that the word “unlawful” is tantamount to a refusal to act on a duty). 
 181.  Cf. id. (suggesting that “unreasonable” is a subjective term). 
 182.  Id. (assuming that the Supreme Court had good reason for differentiating “unlawfully 
withheld” from “unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1) of the APA). 
 183.  Id.  
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In this case, the D.C. district court’s characterization of HHS’s 
noncompliance with the statutory deadline as “unreasonably delayed” rather 
than “unlawfully withheld” was consistent with SUWA and allowed the 
court to use the TRAC balancing test under the discretion afforded by the 
contextual reading of Section 706(1).184  Here, the district court’s decision 
highlights where the D.C. Circuit again correctly departs from the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits’ practice of precluding a discretionary balancing test.185  
The D.C. Circuit’s use of the TRAC test—to determine whether the 
agency’s delay is “so egregious” as to warrant judicial intervention—also 
more closely aligns with the Supreme Court’s caution that mandamus relief 
should be reserved for extraordinary situations.186 
B.  The District Court Erred in Applying the TRAC Test to Hold That 
HHS’s Delay Was Not Sufficiently “Egregious” to Warrant 
Mandamus Relief 
The district court should have granted mandamus relief based on a 
strong showing of the several TRAC factors indicating that HHS’s delay 
was sufficiently “egregious.”187  This Part does not disturb or discredit the 
analysis performed by the district court regarding TRAC factors four and 
six, which weigh against mandamus relief.188  This Part does demonstrate, 
however, that the factors favoring mandamus relief were sufficient to 
outweigh the factors against mandamus relief.189  Part IV.B.1 asserts that 
TRAC factors one and two, relating to the text and purpose of deadline 
within the enabling statute, produced a showing sufficient to have 
warranted mandamus relief.190  Part IV.B.2 proposes that TRAC factors 
three and five, regarding the consequences of the delay to human health and 
welfare, weighed strongly in favor of granting mandamus relief.191 
1.  Text and Purpose of the Deadline Within the Enabling Statute 
The first two TRAC factors, taken together, weigh heavily in favor of 
mandamus relief when an agency violates a statutory deadline.192  In In re 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, the D.C. Circuit determined that 
                                                          
 184.  See supra notes 169–171 and accompanying text. 
 185.  See supra text accompanying notes 72–85. 
 186.  See supra notes 43, 157–171 and accompanying text. 
 187.  See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 188.  See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53–56 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 
F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that TRAC test factors four and six weigh against 
mandamus relief). 
 189.  See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 190.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 191.  See infra Part IV.B.1–2. 
 192.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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a violation of a statutory deadline “does not, alone, justify judicial 
intervention,” but does serve as the “first and most important” of the TRAC 
factors.193  The D.C. Circuit granted mandamus relief in People’s 
Mojahedin by finding that “[t]he specificity and relative brevity of the 180-
day deadline manifests the Congress’s intent that the Secretary act 
promptly” and the Secretary’s twenty-month failure to act “plainly 
frustrates the congressional intent and cuts strongly in favor” of granting 
mandamus relief.194  In short, People’s Mojahedin makes clear two points: 
first, not all TRAC factors weigh equally and, second, delays of extensive 
length necessitate an examination of Congress’ purpose for creating a 
statutory deadline.195 
In this case, the district court incorrectly minimized the importance of 
the statutory deadline.196  The district court’s position that the fourth TRAC 
factor, relating to agency priorities, “reduce[d] the heft of these first two 
factors” demonstrates that the court did not sufficiently emphasize the 
importance of the statutory deadline.197  The statutory deadline in this case, 
ninety days, is half that of the deadline in People’s Mojahedin, and the 
average delay in this case, approximately two years, is larger than the delay 
in People’s Mojahedin.198  In contrast, the court did not issue mandamus 
relief in Barr Labs when the delay was less than a year.199  The violation of 
the statutory deadline at issue here is at least as, if not more, egregious than 
in People’s Mojahedin.200  Accordingly, the district court’s analysis and 
conclusion regarding HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory deadline 
should have more closely resembled People’s Mojahedin than Barr Labs.201 
                                                          
 193.  680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Barr Labs Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991); then quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 194.  Id.  
 195.  See id. (emphasizing that extensive agency delays weigh in favor of mandamus relief).   
 196.  Compare Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 
F.3d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reducing the importance of the statutory deadline), with In re 
People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (emphasizing the importance 
of the statutory deadline). 
 197. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 51.  
 198.  See id.; see also Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Services, (Feb. 7, 2016), 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/important_notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html (explaining 
that the average processing time for appeals decided in fiscal year 2015 was 547.1 days).   
 199.  See In re Barr Labs, Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that an average delay 
of 336 days was not sufficient to issue mandamus relief). 
 200.  Compare Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 51 (approximately two-year delay on a ninety-day 
deadline), with In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (approximately 600-day delay on a 
180-day deadline).   
 201.  See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (issuing mandamus relief for an average 
delay of 600 days); In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74 (denying mandamus relief for an average 
delay of 336 days).   
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By minimizing the importance of first two TRAC factors, the district 
court also declined to follow People’s Mojahedin’s examination of the 
purpose of the deadline within the enabling statute.202  The enabling statute 
in this case requires an ALJ to conduct and conclude a hearing within a 
ninety-day period.203  The statute also provides that a party requesting the 
hearing may escalate its claim to the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”) 
if the ALJ fails to meet the ninety-day deadline.204  The escalation provision 
is critical.205  In failing to make findings as to the purpose of deadlines 
within the statutory scheme, the district court ignored the plausible fact that 
Congress drafted the statute with an escalation clause to facilitate speed in 
the appeals process.206  In other words, if the ALJ cannot provide a timely 
administrative hearing, Congress assured that appellants could bring their 
appeal to another administrative body that can decide the matter quickly.207 
The facts demonstrate that HHS’s noncompliance with its statutory 
deadline, like in People’s Mojahedin, “plainly frustrates the congressional 
intent.”208  The chain reaction caused by ALJ delays frustrate the design of 
the escalation process within the statute.209  For instance, when ALJs do not 
meet their ninety-day deadline, more appellants escalate their claims to the 
DAB.210  The DAB admits that it is “unlikely” that it will “meet the 90-day 
timeframe for issuing decisions in most appeals” because of the increased 
caseload from ALJ escalations.211  Therefore, HHS cannot currently issue 
timely adjudications at either the ninety-day ALJ deadline or the ninety-day 
DAB deadline, leaving judicial review in federal court as the only 
remaining option for a timely adjudication.212  In other words, a party can 
escalate through both the ALJ and DAB levels and seek judicial review in 
federal court in approximately 180 days while the average delay for an ALJ 
hearing is nearly 550 days.213  A rational appellant would certainly choose 
                                                          
 202.  See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (examining Congress’s rationale for 
instituting a statutory deadline).   
 203.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
 204.  Id. § 1395ff(d)(3)(A). 
 205.  See In re People’s Mojahedin, 680 F.3d at 837 (acknowledging that deadlines manifest 
Congress’s intent). 
 206.  Id.  
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id.  
 210.  OMHA Medicare Appellant Forum, Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals 
(“OMHA”) Medicare Appellant Forum, Oct. 29, 2014, Washington, D.C., 
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/files/appellant_forum_presentations.pdf (indicating that escalation from 
the ALJs to DAB increased nearly tenfold from 2013 to 2014).   
 211.  Id. at 60. 
 212.  Id.  
 213.  See supra note 198.  
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the shorter timeline.214  This scenario plainly violates congressional intent, 
as federal courts were not meant to process the bulk of administrative 
appeals, especially those that have not received any previous on-the-record 
hearings.215  Consequently, the district court should have issued mandamus 
relief based on the severity of the delay and the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the escalation process.216 
2.  Human Health and Welfare Interest Associated with Hospital 
Services 
The district court erred in concluding that the human health and 
welfare interests at stake “weigh[ed], if at all, only very lightly,” in favor of 
mandamus relief.217  The third and fifth TRAC factors, taken together, more 
readily compel a court to issue mandamus relief when the interests 
prejudiced by the delay affect human health and welfare.218  The D.C. 
Circuit has explained that human health and welfare are at stake when the 
consequences pose a serious threat to public health.219  The D.C. Circuit’s 
standard for finding such a serious threat derives from cases in which an 
agency delayed in regulating raw milk and when an agency delayed in 
issuing label warnings on aspirin products.220 
In this case, the district court erred in its factual findings regarding the 
impact of HHS’s delay on health and human welfare.221  The district court 
did not dispute that the ALJ hearing backlog and related reimbursement 
delays caused hospitals to “reduce costs, eliminate jobs, forgo services, and 
substantially scale back.”222  The district court found, however, that these 
facts insufficiently affected public health and welfare to compel the court to 
issue mandamus relief.223  For example, the district court found “very few 
specific services . . . are actually less available to the public as a result of 
the delays.”224  At most, the district court found that the uncertainty of 
timely reimbursement forced some rehabilitation facilities party to the suit 
                                                          
 214.   See supra note 210 (indicating that escalation from the ALJs to DAB increased nearly 
tenfold from 2013 to 2014). 
 215.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2012) (designating administrative entities rather than 
courts to adjudicate appeals).  See also In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 837 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (issuing mandamus relief when the missed statutory deadline plainly frustrated 
Congress’s intent). 
 216.  See infra text accompanying notes 217–221.  
 217.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also infra Part IV.B.2. 
 218.  Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 219.  See supra note 105. 
 220.  See supra note 105. 
 221.  See infra notes 222–232. 
 222.  Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52.   
 223.  Id.  
 224.  Id.  
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to decline to admit patients with lower extremity joint replacements and 
certain debilitated physical conditions.225  The district court concluded, 
however, that the inability to admit certain patients was not sufficiently 
comparable to the examples of raw milk or mislabeled aspirin.226 
The district court’s narrow findings of fact overlooked important 
statements related to human health and welfare that were included in the 
plaintiffs’ pleadings.227  For example, one plaintiff hospital pled that it has 
been unable to purchase basic equipment, such as beds for its Intensive 
Care Unit, and has not been able to replace a failing roof in its surgery 
department.228  Additionally, other plaintiff hospitals alleged that they have 
postponed necessary upgrades to their electronic health record systems.229  
The plaintiffs also asserted that they cannot pay competitive wages, which 
risks losing highly skilled and experienced health care professionals.230  By 
declining to address these facts directly, the district court was able to 
conclude that the hospital services mentioned in the pleadings posed fewer 
“immediate and undisputed dangers” to health and human welfare than did 
raw milk or mislabeled aspirin.231  Given the nature of hospital care, 
however, particularly the care of the elderly Medicare population, it is 
plausible that a hospital’s inability to purchase beds, repair roofs, update 
records systems, or keep its skilled doctors, does present immediate and 
undisputed dangers to human health and welfare.232 
Moreover, the district court’s conclusion that interests relating to 
human health and welfare should be discounted because “virtually the entire 
docket of the agency involves issues of this type” is problematic as a matter 
of law in this case.233  The D.C. Circuit developed this rule, in Sierra Club 
v. Thomas,234 where the court analyzed the health and human welfare TRAC 
factor within the context of delays in the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) rulemaking regarding the regulation of strip mine 
                                                          
 225.  Id.  
 226.  Id. (contrasting the danger to public health cause by certified raw milk in Pub. Citizen v. 
Heckler, 62 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D.D.C. 1985) and unlabeled aspirin in Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Grp. v. FDA., 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 227.  See infra notes 228–232. 
 228.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 10, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:14-CV-
851-JEB), 2014 WL 10093552. 
 229.  Brief by the Fund for Access to Inpatient Rehabilitation as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff at 27, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:14-CV-851-
JEB), 2014 WL 10093552. 
 230.  Id. at 28. 
 231.  See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 53 (overlooking certain facts from petitioner’s brief); see 
also supra note 220. 
 232.  See supra notes 228–231. 
 233.  See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
 234.  828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir 1987). 
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fugitive emissions.235  The factual differences between Sierra Club and the 
present case highlight the error of comparison.236  For example, unlike the 
ninety-day ALJ hearing deadline in American Hospital Association v. 
Burwell, the EPA was not under a statutory deadline to issue a rulemaking 
in Sierra Club.237  Additionally, emissions have a relatively remote impact 
on human health and welfare compared to the direct impact that 
underfunded and understaffed hospitals has on human welfare.238  Finally, 
the application of the Sierra Club principle, tailored to delays in EPA 
rulemakings, to HHS, an agency exclusively chartered for health and human 
welfare, creates a scenario where nearly every HHS action is immune from 
a health and human welfare analysis.239  The absurdity of this result reveals 
that the district court should have distinguished Sierra Club from this 
case.240 
In summation, the district court’s conclusion that the human health and 
welfare interests at stake in American Hospital Association v. Burwell were 
insufficient for mandamus relief rested on incomplete findings of fact and 
erroneously applied legal principles.241  The effect of HHS’s delay on the 
human health and welfare interests removes any lingering doubt that the 
district court should have issued mandamus.242 
C.  The Uncertainty of Any Forthcoming Remedy from HHS and 
Congress in Addressing the Delay Further Bolsters the Conclusion 
for Mandamus Relief 
As a matter of public policy, district court’s overreliance on the fourth 
TRAC factor underscores the conclusion that mandamus is appropriate.243  
The district court relied on the principle that “mandamus jurisdiction is not 
a license to intermeddle, and the Court is loath to horn in on the problem-
solving efforts of the other two branches of government.”244  However, the 
uncertainty of any forthcoming remedy from HHS or Congress in 
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 798.  
 236.  See infra notes 237–239. 
 237.  Cf. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 52 (citing Sierra Club, 828 F.2d at 798) (erroneously 
comparing a statutory adjudication deadline to a regulatory rulemaking). 
 238.  Id. (erroneously equating the remote impact of emissions to the more direct impact of 
medical care for hospital patients). 
 239.  Id. (erroneously equating the health and human welfare focus of the EPA to that of HHS). 
 240.  See supra notes 237–239. 
 241.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 242.  See supra Part IV.B.  
 243.  See infra Part IV.C.  This Part does not attempt to provide solutions to the ALJ Hearing 
backlog and the related problems.  Such solutions are outside the scope of this Note.   
 244.  Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 54–55. 
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addressing the delay of Medicare reimbursement hearings bolsters the 
argument for mandamus relief.245 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has demonstrated 
that it is unable to meet, or even come relatively close to meeting, the 
statutory adjudication deadlines for ALJ appeals under the current 
budgetary constraints.246  While ALJs have recently become more 
productive, the volume of ALJ appeals has outpaced ALJ decisions since 
2008 and has recently exceeded four times the amount of cases that the 
ALJs can decide in one year.247  HHS has offered some solutions, including 
standardizing business practices, encouraging mediation, using statistical 
sampling, and implementing electronic case processing.248  These solutions, 
however, will not have a significant or immediate impact in curing the ALJ 
delays.249 
Even an optimistic view of Congress’s commitment to address the ALJ 
adjudication delay brings little comfort to the district court’s decision to 
defer to Congress as problem solver.250  First, both the Senate and House 
Committees on Appropriations have approved different bills with different 
levels of funding for the ALJ hearings for the fiscal year 2016 budget.251  
Both bills, however, would only increase the level of funding by, at most, 
$10 million.252  Furthermore, these bills must still pass in both the House 
and Senate, and the House and Senate must reconcile any differences in 
budget negotiations before the President can sign the budget into law.253  
Second, in June of 2015, the Senate Finance Committee passed the Audit & 
Appeal Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare (“AFIRM”) Act of 
2015, an original bill to improve the Medicare audit and appeals process.254  
                                                          
 245.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 246.  See generally supra note 210. 
 247.  See generally supra note 210. 
 248.  See generally supra note 210. 
 249.  Amy F. Lerman & Robert E. Wanerman, OMHA’s Second Medicare Appellant Forum 
Reveals Some Forward Momentum but No Simple or Quick Solutions for Medicare Administrative 
Appeals Backlog (Epstein Becker Green, Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/11/HCLS-Client-Alert_OMHA-Second-Medicare-
Appellant-Forum.pdf. 
 250.  See infra note 251. 
 251.  H.R. REP. NO. 114-195, at 111 (2015) , 
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt195/CRPT-114hrpt195.pdf (providing $87,381,000 for the 
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, which is the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level 
and $52,619,000 below the budget request); S. REP. NO. 114-74, at 151 (2015), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt74/CRPT-114srpt74.pdf (providing $97,381,000 for the 
Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals, which is $10 million more than provided in the fiscal 
year 2015 but $42,619,000 below the budget request). 
 252.  Id.  
 253.  Id.  
 254.  See also S. REP. NO. 114-177, at 9 (2015), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.Rpt.114-177.pdf.; Press Release, U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee, Hatch, Wyden Praise Committee Passage of the Audit & Appeal Fairness, 
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Assuming an expeditious path for AFIRM into law, the majority of its 
effects would not take effect until 2017.255  Notably, these effects do not 
include a direct solution to the issue of noncompliance with the ALJ’s 
statutory deadline.256 
The undesirable legislative outlook demonstrates bleak hope for HHS 
and Congress to address the problem on their own.257  Moreover, the district 
court’s resistance to intervention enacts the warning offered by Justice 
Marshall’s concurrence in Heckler: 
[R]ecognizing that courts must approach the substantive task of 
reviewing such failures [to meet statutory requirements] with 
appropriate deference to an agency’s legitimate need to set policy 
through the allocation of scarce budgetary and enforcement 
resources. . . . [T]he Court’s approach, if taken literally, would 
take the courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far 
too many cases . . . .258 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Marshall’s caution in Heckler is most appropriate when the 
stakes are high, as in this case.259  Plaintiffs have essentially lost their 
appeal rights, with nearly 2000 appeals, collectively worth more than $10 
million, backlogged at the ALJ level.260  Justice Marshall warned that the 
“dangers of agency inaction are too important, too prevalent, and too 
multifaceted to . . . mandat[e] that courts cover their eyes and their 
reasoning power when asked to review an agency’s failure to act.”261  
Absent mandamus, hospitals will be forced to weather HHS’s extraordinary 
delays, without Medicare payments for services that were already furnished 
to beneficiaries and to which they are entitled.262  The danger to health and 
safety is real and the scope of the problem is measureable in both 
reimbursement dollars and the impact on patients affected by cost 
cutting.263  By noting that Congress is aware of the situation and is in a 
position to address the problem, the D.C. district court proclaimed 
                                                          
Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015 (June 3, 2015), 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=bc09dd5b-84d6-45e2-ba89-
c61a40481489.  
 255.  S. REP. NO. 114-177, at 9. 
 256.  Id.  
 257.  See supra notes 250–258 and accompanying text. 
 258.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 855 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 259.  See infra notes 260–263.   
 260.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 228, at 30. 
 261.  Heckler, 470 U.S. 821 at 854–55 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).   
 262.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d, 812 F.3d 183, 
194 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 263.  See supra notes 227–232 and accompanying text. 
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absolution from a problem it declares it has no business solving.264  But 
after years of delay and no sign of a solution from HHS or Congress, who 
better than the district court to champion the cause of those who seek the 
relief to which they are entitled?   The recent D.C. Circuit remand order 
only reinforces the point that the responsibility, indeed, falls squarely with 
the district court when adequate and timely remedies are not forthcoming 
from the coordinate branches.265 
In failing to issue mandamus relief, the district court succumbed to the 
trappings of a strict posture of deference warned against by Justice 
Marshall.266  Justice Marshall reasoned that a court’s deference to an 
“agency’s legitimate need to set policy through the allocation of scarce 
budgetary and enforcement resources . . . if  taken literally, would take the 
courts out of the role of reviewing agency inaction in far too many 
cases.”267  American Hospital Association v. Burwell stands as a glaring 
example of a case where the court took too literally the charge of deference 
to an agency at the expense of providing relief due under the law. 
 
 
                                                          
 264.  See Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 56 (noting that the court is “not in a position to provide 
that fix”). 
 265.  Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192–94 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see supra Part 
IV.C. 
 266.  See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 854–55 (Marshall, J., concurring) (warning that a court should 
not interpret § 706(1) of the APA too literally at the expense of necessary judicial review and 
intervention). 
 267.  Id. at 855. 
